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NOTES
SOME PROBLEMS AND ASPECTS OF
INTERSTATE EXTRADITION
The Gods grow angry with your patience. 'Tis their care,
And must be yours, that guilty men escape not.
BEN JOHNSON: Catiline, III, 1611
INTRODUCTION
In the United States extradition, or rendition as it is called
in interstate proceedings, can be traced back to the Articles of
Confederation. A provision of the United States Constitution1
specifically deals with the subject and it is further broadened by federal statute. 2 Each of the states also has a separate
law dealing with extradition, and here there has been considerable lack of uniformity and hence great opportunity for
confusion in administration.
Since 1926, there has been an effort to make the law uniform in regard to state statutes. This has been achieved by
the adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in
forty-three states.3 The act brings uniformity in such matters as the form of requisition and the documents to accompany it; the arrest, pending requisition as well as after requisition; bail; habeas corpus proceedings; and the right to
withhold extradition while a criminal prosecution is pending
in the asylum state against the person claimed. It gives to the
governor the power to extradite a person who has come into
the state involuntarily. An important provision of the act permits an accused person to be delivered to a demanding state
even though he is not a fugitive from justice. Another impor4
tant provision of the act permits the waiver of extradition.
No attempt will be made to cover all the aspects of the Uniform Act. Instead selected areas will be studied. In addition
to the Uniform Act, North Dakota law will be discussed with
emphasis on the procedure used in acquiring fugitives from
justice by this state. The types of crimes that are extraditable, Section 6 of the Uniform Act, and the procedure used
in the asylum state will also be given special consideration.
1.

2.
3.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.

18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958).

9 U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1961). States that have not adopted the Act are
as follows: Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, South
Carolina and Washington.
4. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 U.L.A. § 25-A (1957). (hereinafter referred to as U.C.E.A.).
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WHAT TYPES OF CRIMES ARE EXTRADITABLE?

Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution and to a lesser degree in recent times there has arisen the question, what
crimes are extraditable? There has never been any question
as to the serious grades of crime such as treason and felonies,
but the question has been presented in the minds of law enforcement authorities in regard to the crimes which fall into
the catagory of misdemeanors. The Federal Constitution
states that, "a person charged in any state with treason, felony
or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of
the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to- be removed
to the state having jurisdiction of the crime". 5
From the wording of the Federal Constitution it seems clear
that any crime from the highest to the lowest in the grade of
offenses, including misdemeanors, are crimes subject to extradition. 6 Some cases, however, have held that the words
"other crime" means only offenses of the grade of felonies.7
This view is not taken today and the weight of present judicial opinion is that any act forbidden and made punishable by
the laws of the state making the demand is extraditable.8
Looking to the language of the clause, it is difficult to comprehend how any doubt could have arisen as to its meaning
and construction. The words, treason, felony or other crime,
in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and
technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the state. The word crime of itself includes
every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of
offenses, and includes misdemeanors, as well as treason and
felonyY
North Dakota law on this matter is practically identical to
the Federal Constitution.- It would seem from analyzing
North Dakota law that the Governor of North Dakota is com5. Note 1 supra.
6. U.S. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893); Ex parte Reggel, 144 U.S.
642 (1884); Kentucky v. Dennision, 16 I. Ed. 717 (1861).
7. See In re Brown, 112 Mass. 409, 17 Am. Rep. 114 (1873).
8. Taylor v. Tainter, 16 Wall 366, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1873); Kentucky v.
Dennison, supra note 6.
9. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), quoting Blackstone's
Commentaries vol. 4, p. 5.
10. N.D. Cent. Code § 2930-02 (1961). "A person charged in any state
or territory of the United States with treason, felony, or other crime, who
.hall flee from justice and be found in this state, on demand of the executive -authority of the state or territory from which he fled, must be
delivered up by the governor of this state to be removed to the state or
territory having Jurisdiction of the crime."
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pelled to honor extradition proceedings for any crime, including misdemeanors," occuring in another state for the rendition of a fugitive who has taken refuge in this state. This is
in keeping with the federal statutes on extradition which
permit the several states to enact legislation in regard to extradition so long as it does not conflict With the Constitution
and laws 12 of the United States.
There is no statute in North Dakota which restricts the executive department of this state as to the class of offenders
who may be extradited. The governor could, in his discretion,
issue a requisition on the governor of another state for the
surrender of those charged with misdemeanors.13 For practical
reasons however, a person is seldom extradited for a misdemeanor. The less serious nature of a misdemeanor, the number of law enforcement authorities involved and the time and
expense of extradition have to be considered in determining
whether or not it will merit the use of extradition proceedings. It becomes a matter of discretion with the governor
whether to demand the return of petty offenders, and such
14
applications may not be looked upon with favor.
Another matter to be considered in extradition for misdemeanors is the cost of using extradition as a means of obtaining criminals for prosecution. The expenses involved in sending an agent to some part of the country in order to obtain a
fugitive from justice and return him to the jurisdiction making the demand is prohibitive. In many cases the local government has to stand the entire cost of such an unidertaking. In
North Dakota, for example, the state will pay all the costs
of extradition of a person charged with treason or a felony,
while the county bears the cost of extradition for other
crimes. 15
UNIFORM

CRIMINAL

EXTRADITION

ACT-SECTION

6

A main factor in the wide acceptance of the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act can be attributed to Section 6 of the
Act. 16 At first this section does not seem to revolutionize the
11.
12.
13.

Ex parte Quint, 54 N.D. 515, 209 N.W. 1006, 1007
18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958).
Ops. _Att'y Gen. 119 (N.D. 1909-10).

14.

Ibid.

(1926).

15. N.D. Cent. Code § 29-30-14 (1961).
16. See U.C.E.A., § 6, 9 U.L.A. (1957). "The governor of this state may
also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state,
any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided In section 3 with committing an act in this state, or in a third
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law on extradition, but in considering some of the older cases
it will soon be realized why the inclusion of Section 6 in the
Uniform Act has made this act very popular among the states
that have adopted it. In State v. Hall,1 7 the petitioner, while
standing near the border in North Carolina, shot across the
state line into Tennessee and killed a person. Tennessee made
a demand for extradition of the petitioner upon North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that he could
not be extradited because he was not in Tennessee at the time
of the shooting and therefore not a fugitive from justice in
Tennessee.
The United States Constitution, 8 implemented by act of
Congress, 9 provides for the interstate rendition of fugitives
from justice. To satisfy their terms, actual presence within
the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime and subsequent departure are essential. 20 Section 6 of the Act was
adopted to fill the gap which permitted many participants in
criminal conspiracies to escape. Section 6 provides that a person may be surrendered to a demanding state who has committed acts in the asylum state, or in a third state, which intentionally resulted in a crime in the state whose governor is
making the demand.
While this legislation seems desirable and necessary to fulfill the original purpose of extradition, the Uniform Act,
because of Section 6, has been attacked as to its constitutionality. 21 Primarily, the question has been raised whether Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution and federal extradition
statutes have so preempted the field as to exclude and render
unconstitutional state regulation other than, perhaps, regulation in aid of the federal law.
The sole object of the constitutional provision is to assure
rendition to prevent one state from becoming an asylum from
another's justice. 22 The United States Supreme Court has
state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive
authority is making the demand, and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was
not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not
fled therefrom."
17. 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
18. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958).
20. Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903); State v. Hall,
note 17 supra.
21. Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 217, 194 P.2d 800 (1948); see Gulley
v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 210 S.W.2d 514, 519 (1948).
22. See Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 228 (1906); Lascelles
v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 542 (1893).
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said that the federal statute only excludes state action from
matters for which that statute expressly, or by necessary implication, provided.23 Thus, a state may extradite under conditions outside the scope of the federal statute but within the
terms of the Constitution.24
State courts have consistently sustained Section 6 as part
of the powers reserved to the states.25 Its constitutionality
has also been upheld in the federal courts, adding weight to
state court decisions to remove any lingering doubts as to its
validity.26 Although the Supreme Court of the United States
has yet to pass upon the validity of state statutes regulating
non-fugitives, it has recognized that the states are free to
act in matters of extradition so long as such action is not
expressly or by necessary implication prohibited by federal
law.

27

PROCEDURAL STEPS OF EXTRADITION-NORTH DAKOTA
(THE DEMANDING STATE)

In North Dakota statutory procedural rules are lacking
in regard to the steps necessary to make a demand upon
another state for a fugitive from justice. By contrast the
states that have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act have a workable set of procedural rules to follow in using
extradition to obtain fugitives from justice.2s In an area of
law that is based on strict procedural standards it is felt that
a statutory guide would be most helpful.
While North Dakota does not have such a guide, the Executive Department of the state has published a booklet of rules
of practice in matters of requisition and extradition. 9 Appendix I to this article lists the steps to be followed in making a
demand for extradition along with comments in regard to each
phase.
Rule 69 must be given special notice.3° It states, "An appli23. See Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 134 (1916).
24. Innes v. Tobin, note 23 supra; Kelly v. Mangum, 145 Ga. 57, 88 S.E.
556 (1916).
25. Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1942).
"Section 109-6, G.C. Is within the powers reserved to the states and is
therefore not in conflict with § 2, Art. IV of the Federal Constitution and
is a valid exercise of the police power of the State of Ohio."
26. Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
27. Innes v. Tobin, note 23 supra.
28. See U.C.E.A. 9 U.L.A. 263 (1957).
29. Pamphlet, Rules of Practice Before the Executive Department In
Matters of Requisition and Extradition, Governor's Office, Bismarck, North
Dakota. (1931).
30. Note 29 supra.
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cation must not be made upon a constructive crime. The person
charged must have been within the state at the time of the
commission of the crime". This rule would seem to be contrary
to that of the majority of states and especially so as to the
states that have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act.

31

In completing the forms to start the extradition, two complete original sets of all papers upon the application must be
filed: one set to be attached to the requisition, and the other
to be retained in the executive department. When the application for requisition, the warrant of arrest, the complaint, and
the necessary affidavits have been sent to the executive department of the state, the governor will examine them. If the
governor finds all papers in proper order he will then send a
requisition to the authority upon whom made, 32 along with
33
the agent's commission.

PROCEDURAL

STEPS

UNDER

UNIFORM

ACT-ASYLUM

STATE

Under the Uniform Act extradition will succeed if the
asylum state has adopted it and it is not necessary that the
Act be in effect in the demanding state. 34 This fact is important in that North Dakota has not adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act.
When a demand for extradition has been made upon the
asylum state it is necessary to consider several questions. The
first question should ask whether the demand has been made
in proper form.3 5 Extradition is a technical proceeding dealing with alleged criminals, therefore the procedure has to be
strictly adhered to in order to protect the rights of the fugitive. If the demand is not made in proper form he will be
discharged.3- This discharge may result if the demand is not
accompanied by a copy of the indictment, or if there isn't an
affidavit verifying the criminal information.' Next, it should
be determined if the person whose extradition is requested
is identical with the person found in the asylum state.3 8 This
31. U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 6 (1957).
32. Rule 71 op. cit. supra note 29.
33. Rule 72 op. cit. supra note 29.
34. Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 217, 194 P.2d 800 (1948).
35. Ex parte Kaufman, 73 S.D. 166, 39 N.W.2d 905 (1949); Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627 (1949).
36. Russell v. State, 251 Ala. 268, 37 So. 2d 233 (1948).
37. See U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 3 (1957).
38. State v. Parrish, 242 Ala. 7, 5 So. 2d 828 (1941); Splak v. Seay, 185
Va. 710, 40 S.E.2d 250 (1946).
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matter must be carefully determined in order to save innocent
victims of circumstance the embarrassment and humiliation
that would result if positive identity could not be established.
A third question to be determined is whether or not the alleged fugitive is a "fugitive from justice," 39 or has committed an
act which intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding
state.4 0 His reason for leaving the demanding state is not
41
determinative of the issue whether or not he is a fugitive.
He is deemed a fugitive from justice even though he may not
have known that he was charged with the commission of a
crime.42 This happens quite frequently in cases of non-support.
The fugitive is conscious of the fact that he is not supporting his family, but he is not in a position to know if formal
charges have been made against him. Finally, it should be
determined whether the alleged fugitive has been charged with
a substantial crime.4 3 If the alleged fugitive wishes to show
that the acts charged are not a crime under the laws of the
demanding state, the burden is on him to produce the statutes
or laws which show the conduct charged to be noncriminal.
In determining the issues presented in the extradition proceeding, the governor may presume that the request for extradition is valid and has been made in good faith.4 A hearing
is not necessary to determine these issues,15 and the constitutional rights of the alleged fugitive are not violated if the
governor refuses a hearing and decides the issues on the
basis of the papers comprising the request alone.46 In most
cases a hearing is granted when requested in order to afford
the alleged fugitive every opportunity and right under the
law.47 The evidence presented at such a hearing is not limited
to matter legally admissible in a court of law. 4 The evidence
need only be of a type satisfactory to the governor 4 9 the
hearing being an executive function and not a judicial one.
If the questions presented above can be answered in the
affirmative, the governor of the asylum state is said to be
39. ]Ex parte Galbreath, 24 N.D. 582, 139 N.W. 1050, 1051 (1913).
40. See State v. Parrish, note 38 supra. See U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. §§ 3, 6
(1957).
41. Lincoln v. State, 199 Md. 194, 85 A.2d 765 (1952).
42. See State ex rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A.2d 568, 572 (1948).
43. State ex rel. Kojis v. Barczak, 264 Wis. 136, 58 N.W.2d 420, 422 (1953);
see U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 3 (1957).
44. See Ex parte Birch, 89 Okla. 417, 209 P.2d 510, 512 (1949).
45. Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1953).
46. ]Ex parte Colier, 140 N.J. Eq. 469, 55 A.2d 29 (1947).
47. Application of Robinson, 150 Neb. 443, 34 N.W.2d 887, 888 (1948).
48. In re Murphy, 321 Mass. 206. 72 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1947).
49. Ibid.
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under a duty to issue a warrant of extradition. However, he
cannot be compelled by any agency or tribunal to issue a warrant, 51 even though the act may make it his duty to do so
under particular circumstances.52
If the alleged fugitive is not satisfied with the results of the
hearing, he may test the legality of his detention by a writ of
habeas corpus after he has been taken into custody pursuant
to the warrant of extradition.- 3 His right to a writ of habeas
corpus is the same as if he was being illegally detained in proceedings other than in connection with extradition. It is in this
proceeding that the governor's decision on the issues before
mentioned is tested.
It should be noted that throughout the extradition proceedings the warrant of extradition is prima facie valid,54 and the
petitioner for the writ has the burden of proof.55 If his evidence merely creates conflict or doubt, habeas corpus will be
56
denied and he will be extradited.
The petitioner's alibi,51 his guilt or innocence,"8 or the demanding state's motive5 9 behind the demand for extradition
may not be considered in habeas corpus proceedings Courts in
commenting on these points state that in no way is habeas
corpus a final determination of the criminal charges. The petitioner has to take these matters to the courts in the demanding state for determination. Also legally irrelevant in such
proceedings is the fact that the statute of limitations has run
in the demanding state. 60 There is a split of authority whether
the violation of petitioner's constitutional rights in the course
of his past criminal trial in the demanding state is grounds
for denial of extradition,6 1 most authorities hold that it is
not.6 2 Most of the cases decided in this area have been the socalled "chain-gang fugitive" cases where the petitioner contends that he was not afforded the due process of law in the
50. Ex parte Paulson, 168 Ore. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942).
51. Kentucky v. Dennision, 16 L. Ed. 717, 730 (1861).
52.
State v. Rogers, 30 Ala. App. 515, 9 So. 2d 758 (1942); See
U.C.E.A., 9 U.IA. § 2 (1957).
53. U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 10 (1957).
54. In re Murphy, note 48 supra.
55. State ex rel. Stephenson v. Ryan, 235 Minn. 161, 50 N.W.2d 259 (1952).
56. lii. at 264.
57. State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1937).
58. Id. at 148. See U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 20 (1957).
59. Ex parte Cohen, 23 N.J. 209, 92 A.2d 837 (1952).
60. Note 57 supra.
61. Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Harper
v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949).
62. Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1949); United States ex rel.
Faris v. McClain, 42 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Penn. 1942).
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demanding state. The majority of courts contend that th(o
petitioner has to look to the courts in the demanding state foi
his protection and due process.
Under the Uniform Act a fugitive is immune from civil
process in all causes arising out of the same series of acts as
the criminal charge on which he was ret .rned to the demanding state.63 He is immune until he has either been convicted
on the ciriminal charge, or, if acquitted, until he has had a
reasonaole apportunity to return to the state from which hc
was extradited. He is not immune, however, from prosecution on criminal charges other than the charges on which he
was extradited.1 Once a person is before the court it will not
concern itself as to how the person got there.
An appeal is usually granted from the denial of a writ of
habeas corpus.65 Failure to raise objections or issues in the
original hearing on the writ precludes their being raised on
appeal., , Defects in the demand for extradition not raised in
6
the hearing below are deemed waived for purposes of appeal.
Where extradition has been once denied and again requested,
the first proceeding is usually not held to be a binding adjudication of any of the issues raised, although the second request
may allege substantially the same circumstances GR If on appeal
the petitioner is turned down he will then be delivered over
to the demanding state's agent who will return him to that
state for prosecution.
THE UNIFORM ACT AND THE UNIFORM

SUPPORT ACT

In certain situations the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act has had to be construed together with the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. In the area of the crime of
non-support, needs have arisen which often cannot be met by
the extradition laws alone. A husband who does not support
his family while in the demanding state, and who then leaves
that state, is clearly extraditable."9 But a husband who provides his family while residing with them in the demanding
state, and who thereafter deserts them by fleeing to another
63. U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 25 (1957)
64. U.C.E.A., 9 U.L.A. § 26 (1957).
65. Petty v. Morrow, 149 Kan. 875, 89 P.2d 835 (1939).
66. Ex parte Rubens, 73 Ariz. 101, 238 P.2d 402 (1951); State v. Wilson,
135 N.J.L. 398, 52 A.2d 50 (1947).
67. Lawrence v. King, 203 Ind. 252, 180 N.E. 1 (1932).
68. Letwick v. State, 211 Ark. 1, 198 S.W.2d 830 (1947).
69. Gatewood v. Culbreath, 47 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1950); Lincoln v. State,
199 Md. 194, 85 A.2d 765 (1952).
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state, may sometimes not be reached by the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, particularly in those instances where the law
of the demanding state requires the act of non-support to
have taken place within its own borders. Under these circumstances, he is neither a fugitive from justice nor does he come
within the scope of Section 6.70 This situation is avoided in
states which have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce71
ment of Support Act.
CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that criminal activity has been on the rise in the United States during the past
several decades. This fact has led us to make several changes
in the procedure by which criminal justice is administrated.
One of the most apparent needs in modernizing the administration of criminal justice is that of facilitating the transfer
of criminals from one state to another. This prevents one
state from becoming a sanctuary for criminals who are engaged in the commission of crimes in neighboring states.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act brings uniformity
to all the procedural steps involved in criminal extradition.
The adoption of the Act by the various states constitutes a
definite recognition of the duty imposed by the Constitution.
Moreover, it provides a method by which complete uniformity
of action can be achieved in a very difficult field. This highly
desirable result can be accomplished only by legislation in each
state, defining the duties and prescribing the actions of the
governor and other interested officers.
Unfortunately, North Dakota has not adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act. It is felt that the Uniform Act
should be adopted by this state to secure the advantages it
offers in its complete coverage of interstate extradition. Uniformity would eliminate loopholes which exist when separate
laws are attempted to be enforced against organized crime,
which knows no boundaries.
If North Dakota doesn't adopt the Uniform Act verbatim,
careful attention should be paid to it in the interest of promoting uniformity with the procedures of other states.
KERMIT EDWARD BYE
70.
71.

McKnight v. Forsyth, 129 Colo. 64, 266 P.2d 770 (1954).

For a more detailed discussion on this see 37 N.D. L. Rev. 421 (1961).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

APPENDIX I
NORTH DAKOTA PROCEDURE FOR MAKING
EXTRADITION DEMAND
1.

Application to Governor.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Name of fugitive.
Fact that the person requested is a fugitive from justice.
Fact that the person requested fled from state to avoid arrest.
Type of arrest. (civil or criminal)
Fact of such arrest.
Statement as to time and place of flight.
Application must be signed and verified.

In the case of forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, seduction under
promise of marriage, fraudulent transfers, and selling mortgaged property, the application should be verified by the injured party, and if not so
done the reason why should be given.
2.

Affidavits required.
a.
b.
c.
d.

Principal complaining witness.
County Justice.
Clerk of Court.
District Judge.

These affidavits, which cross-certify the previous named
should accompany the application and criminal complaint.
3.

officials,

Warrant of arrest.

If the alleged fugitive from justice is known to be under arrest in
either civil or criminal proceedings, the fact of such arrest and the nature of such proceedings must be fully stated.
4.

Criminal complaint.

An affidavit of the Clerk of the District Court should be included
attesting to the fact that the warrant of arrest and criminal complaint
are true and literal copies and the same remain on file in the office of the
Clerk of the District Court. If no indictment has been found, the reason
must be shown under oath. If the offense is not of recent occurrence,
reasons must be given why the application has been delayed.
5.

Agents commission.
a.
b.

Must state agents residence.
Must state agents official capacity.

An affidavit to the effect that the principal complaining witness is
not using this as a means of collecting a debt or for any private purpose
whatsoever should be included with the application. In cases of seduction
under promise of marriage, the affidavit of one or more persons of well
known respectability must be furnished as to the previous chaste char-
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333

acter of the injured party. Proof by affidavit of facts and cirmumstances,
satisfying the Governor that the alleged criminal has fled from the justice of the state, must be given. A statement to the effect that the fugitive
is not sought for the purpose of collecting a debt or enforcing a civil
remedy, nor that criminal proceeding will be used when said offender is
arrested, for any of said objects, must be set forth in the application
otherwise no requisition will be issued. The opinion of the States Attorney
as to the propriety of. granting the requisition must be stated, and he
must also certify that he has carefully examined the application and
accompanying papers, and approves the same. In no cases will a requisition for a fugitive from justice be granted at the same time upon the
Governor of more than one state.

